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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






RONNIE COLEMAN, JR., 




ACADEMY BUS LLC, Academy Express;  
 SOUTH AMBOY POLICE DEPARTMENT; 
MIDDLESEX POLICE DEPARTMENT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-01931) 
District Judge:  Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 4, 2021 
 
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Ronnie Coleman, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate 
in part, and remand to the District Court for further proceedings. 
In February 2020, Coleman filed his complaint, which he later supplemented with 
a “verified answer,” alleging that he was arrested based on a bus driver’s false statement 
to the police.  He also asserted that the “South Amboy Police Department made me walk 
around on the concrete outside in freezing temperature[s] with no shoes or socks on my 
feet.”  Coleman further claimed that, while in custody, jail employees slammed him into 
a wall, hit and kicked him in the face, and sprayed him with mace.  He named as 
defendants a bus company, the South Amboy Police Department, the Middlesex County 
Jail, and the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office.  As a basis for relief, Coleman cited 
the New Jersey Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) and provisions of the New Jersey 
Criminal Code.1  Coleman sought $50,000 in damages.    
Although the District Court had not ordered service of the complaint, the bus 
company filed an answer which included cross-claims against the co-defendants for 
contribution and indemnification.  The District Court granted Coleman’s motion to 
proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim 
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), holding that no private right of action existed under the 
statutes that Coleman had cited.  Coleman appealed.            
 
1 In particular, Coleman cited N.J.S.A. § 2C:28-4(a) (false reports to law enforcement 
authorities); § 2C:13-3 (false imprisonment); § 2C:12-1(b) (assault). 
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Our review of a sua sponte 
dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), like that of a 
dismissal on a party’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), is de novo.  
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 The District Court properly rejected Coleman’s attempt to raise claims under the 
New Jersey Criminal Code, because the statutes he cited do not create a private cause of 
action.  See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190 
(1994) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a “bare criminal statute”); Leeke v. 
Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1981) (holding that a private party has no right to 
compel enforcement of criminal laws).  Similarly, the APSA does not provide Coleman 
with cause of action to remedy the treatment that he allegedly suffered.  See In re 
Farnkopf, 833 A.2d 89, 91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (stating that the APSA 
“authorizes protective services providers … to pursue legal relief for the benefit of 
vulnerable adults”) (internal footnote omitted).  Therefore, we will affirm that portion of 
 
2 When Coleman filed his notice of appeal, the bus company’s cross-claims against the 
co-defendants were still pending, and it appeared that this Court lacked appellate 
jurisdiction.  See Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(normally, outstanding cross-claims will prevent a District Court order from being 
considered final).  Here, however, the bus company later filed a notice of voluntarily 
dismissal as to all cross-claims.  The District Court approved that voluntary dismissal.  
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.  See Bethel v. McAllister Bros., 81 
F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[A]n otherwise non-appealable order may become final 
for the purposes of appeal where a plaintiff voluntarily and finally abandons the other 
claims in the litigation.”); see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 
551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Even if the appeals court would have lacked jurisdiction at the 
time an appeal was filed, the court has jurisdiction if, as a result of subsequent events, 
there are no longer any claims left to be resolved by the district court.”). 
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the District Court’s judgment that dismissed the claims that Coleman brought under the 
New Jersey statutes cited above.   
We conclude, however, that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to 
provide Coleman with leave to amend his complaint.  In pro se civil rights actions, 
“district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when 
dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or 
futile.”  Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Here, the District Court failed to offer leave to amend or explain why it 
would not make such an offer.  Cf. United States ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that “outright refusal to grant leave to 
amend without a justification such as ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the 
part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, 
futility of amendment, etc.’ is considered an abuse of discretion” (quoting Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962))).  Because it is possible that Coleman could set forth 
plausible claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the facts set forth in his pleadings, we 
will vacate the District Court’s judgment in part and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
